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Abstract 
 
Combining data on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) in pesticides with bilateral trade and 
standard gravity variables over 2005-11, this paper identifies the effect of the complete 
harmonization of MRLs across EU member states on inter- and intra-EU agri-food trade. We 
make an empirical contribution to the impact assessment of standards literature by identifying 
the trade effects of three different harmonization dynamics in health-related standards:  
complete harmonization of domestic and foreign regulation (intra-EU members), 
harmonization of standards between a large number of foreign markets (non EU-members), 
harmonization of standards towards international levels (non EU-members). Significantly, we 
find that the harmonization of MRL standards may have led to greater trade at both margins 
for all different sub-samples, even those including developing country exporters.  Our results 
also suggest that having different MRL regulations is mostly costly at the extensive margin; 
this is found to be especially true for intra-EU15 agri-trade.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to identify the effect of (the complete) harmonization of Maximum Residue 
Levels (MRL) across EU member states on inter- and intra-EU agri-food trade.  Regulation 
(EC) No 396/2005 contains a list of MRLs that came into effect on September 2008 and 
effectively repealed national MRL regulation from there onwards. Thus, before 1 September 
2008, a mixed system was in place with harmonised Community MRLs for ca. 250 active 
substances and national MRLs for the remaining substances. After this date, harmonised 
MRLs became applicable for all active substances used in plant protection products that have 
the potential to enter the food chain. 
 
The removal of heterogeneity in MRL regulation across EU member states is likely to be an 
advantage to exporters targeting the EU market since they now need to comply with a single 
set of regulations as opposed to multiple sets in the past, thus reducing the extent of 
“regulatory protectionism” (Baldwin et.al., 2000). The same reasoning is expected to apply to 
trade between EU member states since food regulations of the “foreign” markets coincide 
perfectly with domestic regulations. 
 
Our empirical approach is embedded in Melitz’s (2003) heterogeneous firms approach, 
wherein a firm’s decision to export depends on the level of fixed cost in a given market and 
the ability to meet sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS) such as MRLs constitutes an 
important element of such fixed costs. A harmonization of MRLs thus leads to a reduction in 
fixed costs for all exporters to the harmonized market, given that a representative firm is now 
making a joint entry decision for all markets in the harmonizing region. Empirically, we use a 
two-stage estimation structure, where the first stage consists of a Probit gravity estimation 
yielding a proxy for the extensive margin. This is then used to correct for the heterogeneity-
bias in the second stage of the estimation. 
 
The analysis is conducted at the sectoral level, focusing on HS Chapters 7 to 12, which are 
the agriculture and processed food sectors where pesticide MRLs are relevant. It is found that 
the harmonization of MRL regulation may have led to greater trade in these products at both 
margins for both EU and non-EU exporters including from developing countries, which is a 
significant finding, hitherto unobserved in the impact-assessment of standards literature. In 
general, regulatory heterogeneity was found to affect the probability to export more adversely 
and this result was found to be especially true for intra-EU15 trade.  
  
 
 
2. Heterogeneous Standards as Trade Barriers 
 
While SPS measures integrate the markets of members participating in the harmonization of 
such measures, they can also act as barriers to those who are excluded from such 
harmonization. Country-specific standards effectively create additional costs for foreign 
producers by forcing them to adjust their product and production process so as to meet 
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individual national standards. Further costs emanate from the need for subsequent conformity 
assessment with these standards (World Bank TBT Survey, 2004; Baldwin, 2000; Chen and 
Mattoo, 2004; Wilson, Chen and Otsuki, 2006).  
 
Heterogeneity in standards creates two negative side effects. Firstly, foreign producers are 
hurt by increased production costs, which may even be prohibitive and especially 
burdensome for developing countries trying to get access to industrialized countries’ markets. 
Secondly, by creating artificial entry barriers to national markets, country-specific standards 
have a negative effect on efficiency by preventing firms forced to meet different standards for 
different markets from being able to take advantage of economies of scale, thus dampening 
productive efficiency. When markets remain segmented by such barriers, firms are further 
able to raise prices over marginal costs, implying less allocative efficiency than could be 
reached with integrated markets.  
 
Additionally, Baldwin (2000) points to a “magnification effect of globalization”: the greater 
the freeness of trade, the greater the effect of any remaining barriers especially from an 
economic geography point of view. In other words, a reduction in distortion arising from 
tariff barriers, will lead to an increased impact of regulatory differences on the location of 
production.  
 
3. Literature review 
 
The main strand of the standards-literature has generally been more concerned with the 
link between standards and innovation and standards and growth
3
. 
 
However, firm level surveys have a l s o  been conducted to estimate the direct impact 
of standards and technical regulations on firms’ production costs and export performance. 
For instance, Wilson and Otsuki ( 2004) looked at 689 firms in over 20 industries in 17 
developing countries in a World Bank TBT survey and found 70% of them reporting 
facing technical regulations in their export markets, especially the EU and the US. The 
authors also show that testing procedures and lengthy inspection reduce exports of 
developing countries t o  t hese  marke ts  by 9% and 3% respectively while standards 
reduce the likelihood of exporting to more than three markets by 7%. The study also 
showed that the firms needed to make significant investments
4
 to meet these standards 
or had to lay off workers instead to keep the costs down.  
 
                                                          
3
 General overviews of this literature are available in Farrell and Saloner (1987), David and Greenstein 
(1990), Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Matutes and Regibeau (1996); trade-related aspects of this literature 
are discussed by Matutes and Regibeau (1996), Kende (1992), Gandal and Shy (1996), Wallner (1998), 
Jeanneret and Verdier (1996) and DIN (Deutsches Institut für Normung, 1999); e.g. Blind and Jungmittag 
(2004), Jungmittag, Blind and Grupp (1999). 
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 These included investments in additional plant or equipment, one-time product redesign, product redesign 
for each export market, additional labor for production, additional labor for testing and certification. 
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The empirical literature has also evolved to estimate the trade effects of diverging standards 
directly from the number or costs of standards: for instance see Moenius (1999), Swann, 
Temple and Shurmer ( 1996), Vancauteren and Weiserbs ( 2003) Mantovani & 
Vancauteren (2003).  
 
On the other hand, theoretical literature on this subject remains scant. Ganslandt & Markusen 
(2001) have modeled TBTs formally (though not their liberalization). Baldwin (2000) and 
Mattoo and Chen (2004) have modeled both TBTs and their liberalization, cautioning 
against the discriminatory effects that the latter may entail. Mattoo and Chen (2004) a l so  
found harmonization in the EU to  raise both intra-regional trade as well as trade with 
excluded developed countries, though their results also indicate that such harmonization 
diverts trade away from developing countries. 
 
In more recent work, Moenius (2006) estimates the effects of national and internationally 
harmonized standards on trade between Canada and its major trading partners in electricity-
dependent products over 1980-1995 for 471 four-digit SITC industries. His results suggest 
that while both national and international harmonization has positive effects on trade in 
electricity-dependent products, the former dominates the latter. Moreover, country size 
matters: smaller countries benefit more from international harmonization.      
 
Baller (2007) investigates trade effects of the regional liberalization of TBTs in the form of 
harmonization and mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for testing procedures in telecoms 
and medical devices. While she finds MRAs to have a strong positive influence on both 
export probabilities and trade volumes for partner countries, she finds the impact of 
harmonization on members and excluded developing countries to be negligible. However, 
this impact is found to be large and positive on excluded OECD countries. In all cases, she 
finds harmonization to have a stronger impact at the extensive margin compared to the 
intensive margin of trade. 
 
Shepherd (2007) uses a new database of EU product standards in the textiles, clothing and 
footwear sectors to show that international standards harmonization is associated with 
increased partner country export variety. Specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of internationally harmonized standards is associated with a 0.2 percent increase 
in partner country export variety. The harmonization elasticity is also found to be around 50 
percent higher for low income countries, which suggests that they may be particularly 
constrained in adapting products to meet multiple standards. These findings are also 
consistent with a heterogeneous firms model of trade in which harmonization is beneficial at 
the extensive margin provided that any increases in compliance costs are not too large. 
 
De Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) study the trade effects of harmonization of food 
regulation in the EU on intra-EU trade over 1990-2001 and find this harmonization to have a 
large and positive trade effect both at the aggregate level and for individual food sectors.    
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In more closely related research, Achterbosch et.al. (2009) studied the impact of differences in 
pesticide MRLs on Chilean fruits
5
 exports to the EU15 over 1996-2007 and found a 5% 
reduction in the EU’s regulatory tolerance levels for MRLs to lead to a 14.8% decline in export 
volumes, with grapes being twice as sensitive as the other fruits.     
 
Foletti (2013) uses data on MRL regulation for 20 countries over 2005-2010 to find that these 
MRLs fostered trade in the 117 agricultural goods in the sample, thus emphasizing the 
informative and trade creating feature of such SPS measures. 
 
However, the paper closest to ours is Winchester et.al. (2012) that studies the impact of 
regulatory heterogeneity on the EU’s agri-food trade in the year 2009-10 by using the NTM6-
Impact database that was assembled under a European research framework programme. Their 
results indicate that differences in most regulations weakly reduce trade, but that stricter MRLs 
for plant products in one country relative to others reduces exports to that country. Unlike 
Winchester et.al. (2012), we only focus on MRLs in pesticides in our paper but this enables us to 
include more products and trading partners and also give a panel dimension to our analysis.    
 
 
4. Empirics 
 
4.1. Measures of MRL regulation heterogeneity   
 
We construct the following heterogeneity index of MRLs:   
 
       
                            
               
 
 
The index, f, measures the degree of heterogeneity of MRL regulation between importer i and 
exporter j, regarding the maximum residue level of pesticide k allowed to be remain on product 
p.   The value of the index ranges between 0 and 1, where     indicates that for the same 
pesticide and crop, the importer and exporter have equal MRLs and there is therefore no 
heterogeneity. Because we assume that differences in MRLs will affect trade though increase in 
trade costs due to the presence of compliance costs, we are not interested in cases in which the 
exporting country has stricter MRL regulations than the importing country. Compliance costs 
for the exporting country arise only if the importing country has stricter MRLs and therefore the 
numerator of f measures the difference between the exporter's MRL and the importer's MRL 
only if the latter is smaller. If the importer's MRL is larger, the heterogeneity of MRLs between 
the countries becomes superfluous to trade. As f approaches 1, the greater is the difference 
between the importer and exporter MRL regulation.   
 
                                                          
5
 These included blueberries, kiwifruit, cherries, plums, grapes and apples.  
6
 This includes measures such as product requirements/food safety limits, process requirements, presentation 
requirements, conformity assessment requirements and other country-specific requirements.     
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A few cases must be noted. Not all countries set MRLs for the same pesticide/crop combination, 
it can therefore be the case that the importer country sets an MRL for a k,p pair for which the 
exporting country has not set a limit. Some countries set default MRLs for any k,p combination 
that is not explicitly cited in their MRL regulation, such as the EU that sets an MRL of 0.01 ppm 
for any pesticide on any crop that is not listed in the MRL Directive . Thus, where pertinent, we 
have imputed default values for all i-j-k-p combinations. If a country does not have default 
MRLs we assume that they are not regulating and thus no compliance costs arise. In the absence 
of default MRLs, therefore, not having an MRL boils down to the partner country having a 
stricter MRL regulation and thus the index takes the value of 1 if the partner country is the 
importer and 0 if it is the exporter.    
 
Our heterogeneity index is very similar to that in Achterbosh et. al. (2009), except that we do not 
consider heterogeneity when the exporter is stricter in setting standards (thus, their index ranges 
from (-1,1), where the lower bound refers to the exporter country having much stricter regulation 
that the importer country).  Just as in Achterbosh et. al. (2009), we proceed to aggregating the 
index for each product by constructing the following:   
 
       
 
 
∑       
 
       
 
 where K is the total number of pesticides for which there is an MRL on product p.    
 
4.2. Empirical methodology   
 
Our empirical analysis is conducted in the framework of the gravity model, which following 
Melitz (2003) additionally exploits the fact that not all countries trade with each other and if they 
do, those trade flows are not necessarily symmetric. These considerations give rise to a two-
stage estimation procedure, as in Helpman et. al. (2008). In addition to correcting for the 
Heckman (1979) selection bias, Helpman et. al. (2008) use Melitz (2003) to argue that a 
correction for biases arising from asymmetries in trade flows is also necessary to obtain 
consistent results. 
 
We therefore use the Heckman (1979) two-step estimator to control for the large number of zero 
trade flows between partners. Zero trade flows become increasingly probable as the level of 
disaggregation of products increase, which is also true for our data. The Heckman estimation 
also allows us to distinguish between the effect that MRL harmonization has at the intensive and 
extensive margins of trade. A strong negative effect at the extensive margin suggests that having 
dissimilar MRL regulations between countries is a fixed cost that producers have to overcome 
before being able to export. The same effect at the intensive margin suggests that the costs of 
complying with different MRL regulations is variable and increases with the value of exports. 
Literature suggests that harmonization initiatives affect both fixed and variable costs (Baldwin, 
2000; Mattoo and Chen, 2004). 
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To examine the trade effects of the harmonization of MRL regulations, reflected by the index F, 
we include this index in the standard gravity equation, which is estimated using the Heckman 
(1979) two-step estimator. The Heckman two-step estimation involves running a first stage 
Probit that estimates the effect of explanatory variables on the probability of exporting. The 
second step comprises an MLE with the natural logarithm of exports as dependent variable on 
the same set of control variables as in step one with the exclusion of at least one variable that 
should affect trade only at the extensive margin
7
. Following Helpman et. al. (2008), we also use 
common religion between the trading partners as the selection variable.  
 
The explanatory variables include the index of heterogeneity F, the preferential tariff of the 
importer country towards the exporter, a dummy variable identifying whether the country pair 
have are signatories of the same PTA at time t, and standard dyadic gravity control variables 
which are grouped into two vectors:        . The vector     is made up of: the log of distance, 
common border, common language, colonial heritage
8
, the natural logarithm of distance 
between trading partners, dummy variables taking the value of unity when the pair shares a 
border, if the pair had a colonial relationship, if they have a common language and whether the 
major religion is the same in both countries (only in step one).    
 
Formally, we have the following baseline specifications:  
 
Step one: 
 
  (       )   [          (       )                              
  (           )                                  ]    (1) 
 
Step two:  
 
  (             )             (       )                              
  (           )                                     (2) 
 
The use of fixed effects on Probit estimations has come under intense scrutiny since Heckman 
(1981) identified a bias due to incidental parameters. This methodology, however, continues to 
be very common in the trade literature, and the gravity
9
 of the bias might not be as large as 
                                                          
7
 In order to correctly identify the selection equation of the Heckman estimation, the selection equation (first 
stage Probit) has to have additional explanatory variables than the outcome equation. These explanatory 
variables have to satisfy the criterion that they affect the probability of having positive exports (therefore setting 
up a trading relationship) but that once the relationship has been set, the volume of exports is not affected. 
Helpman et al (2008) propose a theoretically valid variable, which is the cost of regulatory entry into a market, 
but because such data is scarce and limits estimation samples considerably, they find that common religion 
between trading partners has the exclusion property.  
8
 Four variables summarize the colonial heritage: whether or not the pair has ever been in a colonial relationship, 
whether the pair was part of the same colonial empire, whether the pair is still in a colonial relationship and 
finally, whether the pair had a common colonizer after 1945. 
9
 Pun intended 
8 
 
initially believed. Greene (2004) shows that even with short panels the Tobit estimator is not 
inconsistent due to the incidental parameter problem, and since Tobit and Probit estimations 
share distribution functions this conclusion can be applied to both. 
 
4.3. Data 
 
We use data on MRL regulation over 2006 to 2011 for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Switzerland, Chile, China, India, Israel Japan, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, USA and the EU-15 members
10
. The data on MRL 
regulation were acquired from a private company HOMOLOGA that updates MRL regulation 
from these countries on a monthly basis. The data are intended mainly for agricultural producers 
wishing to export their crops.  
 
However, the richness of the data received from Homologa could not be fully exploited because 
of the large amount of crops which are too specific compared with HS6 level data
11
. To enable 
an empirical trade analysis of these MRLs, it becomes impossible to use these specific 
observations since they would introduce MRL variation within the HS code that cannot be 
matched by trade variables. We therefore only kept those crops specified in Homologa that were 
either a perfect match (e.g. avocados are listed separately in Homologa and have the HS code 
080440), broader than the HS 6 category (e.g. Brassicas, for which we proceed to apply the 
MRL to all HS codes that have this description) and in very few cases, we took the average of 
no more than two crops listed within the HS code (e.g. plantains and bananas). These last 
exceptions were made considering the economic importance of these crops. Because we are 
considering MRLs, we concentrate on non-processed food products, and therefore include most 
of the HS6 codes under Chapters 7 through 12. The list of HS codes is reported in Table 8 at the 
end of the paper. 
 
Export data come from the BACI database, which is constructed from UN COMTRADE trade 
data after reconciling exporter and importer declarations and thus expanding the availability of 
bilateral trade data. BACI is available at the HS6 level and records exports per USD thousands, 
in current prices. The bilateral variables distance, common border and colonial relationship are 
also taken from BACI. GDP and population data were sourced from the Penn World Tables, and 
the common religion variable comes from Elhanan Helpman’s and Xavier Sala-i-Martin's 
webpages, the latter being used to construct the binary variable for intra-EU countries, data 
which are not available in the former database. The PTA variable was compiled by Jose de 
Sousa, who makes it available through his website
12
. All data are summarized in Tables 4 
through 7. 
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 India and Russia are missing data for 2006, while Singapore is missing data for 2006-2008. 
11
 For instance, some of the crops included acerola, sour cherry, balsam apple, all of which do not have a 
corresponding HS6 level code. 
12
 http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm 
9 
 
We separate the panel into different samples in order to highlight the different magnitude of 
effect that heterogeneity of MRL regulation can have depending on the importer and exporters 
involved. Our first sample includes all countries for which MRL regulation was publicly 
available to foreign interested parties; the 35 countries listed above as importers, and 123 
additional countries as exporters
13
. The second sample removes all exporting countries that do 
not have MRL regulations, and therefore we concentrate on bilateral trade between countries 
that are actively setting these sanitary measures. To exploit the total harmonization of EU 
standards, the third sample includes only EU 15 countries as importers with exports from around 
the globe, finalizing with a EU 15 only sample.   
 
5. Results and analysis 
 
Tables 1 and 2 report the results of the Heckman two-step estimations of our baseline 
specifications using four different samples All estimations are run with importer, exporter and 
time fixed effects. Product fixed effects are introduced at the HS4 level in order to limit the 
degrees of freedom lost due the significant number of dummy variables already being estimated. 
These sets of fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity at the importer, exporter and 
product level, separately. Gravity control variables are also included in all estimations as 
described in Section 4.2. We also include multilateral resistance terms à la Baier and Bergstrand 
(2009) to avoid having to estimate country-time fixed effects to correct for multilateral 
remoteness of countries. To do this we calculate multilateral resistance terms for all of the 
gravity controls states above and include them in the estimations.  
 
In order to correctly interpret the coefficients of the outcome and selection equation of the 
Heckman two-step, we calculate the marginal effects of each coefficient of interest. The 
marginal effects of the Probit are straightforward and the two-step framework does not modify 
how they are derived. In the case of the explanatory variables that appear in both the selection 
and outcome equation, in order to interpret their effect on the volume of trade, one must take 
into consideration their impact on both steps. Greene (2003) proposes the following equation to 
calculate these variables’ marginal effects:  
 
  [     |       ]
  
  ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂        ,  
 
where  ̂ is the outcome coefficient,  ̂ is the selection coefficient,  ̂  is the estimated correlation 
between the erros in the two equations, and  ̂ is the error from the outcome equation, and      
is a function of the inverse mills ratio    ̂    ̂  ̂   ̂ . Table 3 reports the marginal effects of 
the MRL regulation heterogeneity index on both equations, for four different samples.  
 
5.1. Results for the full sample 
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 There are 158 exporters in total. 
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Column 1 of Table 1 reports the results from estimating equations (1) and (2) for the full sample. 
The coefficient of our MRL heterogeneity index is found to be negative and significant in 
explaining both the probability of trading and the volumes of exports. In column 1 of Table 3, 
we report the marginal effects of F on both the selection and the outcome equation. We find that 
an increase of 1 percentage point in the index leads to a 16 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of exporting, and an 8 percentage point decrease in the volume of exports. Since the 
index measures the degree of regulatory heterogeneity, a decline in the value of F i.e. 
harmonization of MRL standards, is associated with an increase in trade at both margins. 
 
The coefficients on the gravity control variables are consistent with previous gravity estimates. 
Countries with common colonial heritage, or with common language or which are adjacent to 
each other have higher probabilities of exporting to each other, and export larger volumes. The 
same is true for countries that are similar in terms of population and GDP. Distance is found to 
reduce both the probability of trading and the volumes of trade between partners.  
 
We also find that higher preferential tariffs reduce exports, both at the intensive and extensive 
margins, which is an expected result. A country-pair that is a member of the same PTA is also 
likely to trade more, again at both margins. 
 
5.2. Results for the sub-sample of countries that set MRL regulations 
 
The coefficient of our MRL heterogeneity index is again found to be negative and significant in 
explaining both the probability of trading and the volumes of exports. Column 2 of Table 1 
reports the results from estimating equations (1) and (2) for the sub-sample of countries that set 
MRL regulations. In column 2 of Table 3, we report the marginal effects of F on both the 
selection and the outcome equation. We find that an increase of 1 percentage point in the index 
leads to a 34 percentage point decrease in the probability of exporting, and a 0.6 percentage 
point decrease in the volume of exports.  
 
These results suggest that between these countries, having different MRL regulations is mostly 
costly at the extensive margin, rather than at the intensive. This result may reflect the fact that 
when countries set MRLs, they are based on good agricultural measures which are adapted to 
apply to domestic MRL regulation and therefore changing from one regulation to another might 
be more costly at the beginning than once the compliance costs are met. Countries that do not set 
MRL standards might see a large amount of heterogeneity within the country on how production 
is done since MRL regulations are not enforced. 
 
The coefficients on the gravity control variables are consistent with previous gravity estimates 
and those reported for the full sample. 
 
5.3. Results for the sub-sample of EU-15 reporters and intra-EU15 trade 
 
Results for EU-15 importers and intra-EU15 trade reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, 
respectively, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 1 and suggest that harmonized 
11 
 
MRL regulation may have led to greater trade at both margins in both cases. The gravity control 
variables also retain their expected impacts in these results and distance continues to be 
positively correlated with the probability of exporting.  This result is probably driven by two 
facts: importers in this sample are only within the EU, a relatively small area compared to the 
distances goods are shipped across meaning that relative to the general distance travelled, the 
extra distance from one EU country to the other is not defining. And secondly, because we have 
exporter fixed effects, and importers are so close geographically, the log of bilateral distance is 
capturing very little variability and between EU countries’ relative distance to each other. 
 
Marginal effects reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that an increase of 1 percentage 
point in the index leads to a 20.6 (80.1) percentage point decrease in the probability of exporting, 
and a 21 (12.1) percentage point decrease in the volume of exports for our sub-sample of EU-15 
exporters (intra-EU15 trade). 
 
These last results highlight the much more positive impact that harmonization of standards has 
had on the export of agri-products destined for EU-15 markets from both within and outside EU-
15, including from the developing world, especially at the extensive margin. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper adds to the impact assessment of standards literature by examining the trade effects 
of the complete harmonization of pesticide MRLs across EU member states on inter- and intra-
EU agri-food trade, following Regulation (EC) No 396/2005. 
Our results, that are impervious to different sub-samples, suggest that this harmonization may 
have led to greater trade at both the intensive and extensive margin, though regulatory 
heterogeneity is found to be a greater impediment in the probability of exporting  
The extensive margin impact is found to be especially strong in the case of intra-EU15 trade 
thereby suggesting that a harmonization of MRL regulation may have greatly fostered the 
decision to export within EU-15.     
Finally, in a significant departure from previous literature (for instance Chen and Mattoo, 
2004; Baller, 2007) we find that the harmonization of MRL standards seems to have fostered 
agri-trade into EU15 from developing country exporters as well.     
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Tables  
Table 1 Heckman two-step estimation (1) 
 Full Sample Sample of only MRl regulators 
   (             )   (       )   (             )   (       ) 
F -0.433
***
 -0.167
***
 -0.471
***
 -0.341
***
 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) 
     
  (       ) -0.301
***
 -0.069
***
 -0.338
***
 -0.093
***
 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
     
PTA 0.775
***
 0.388
***
 0.798
***
 0.565
***
 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.15) (0.06) 
     
lndist -0.776
***
 -0.174
***
 -0.625
***
 -0.084
**
 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) 
     
contig 1.574
***
 0.678
***
 1.559
***
 0.817
***
 
 (0.19) (0.07) (0.19) (0.10) 
     
comlang_off 0.498
***
 0.301
***
 0.358
***
 0.319
***
 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.12) (0.05) 
     
colony 0.156 0.062 0.037 -0.018 
 (0.17) (0.05) (0.21) (0.07) 
     
curcol -0.025 0.327   
 (0.36) (0.27)   
     
col45 0.778
***
 0.353
***
 0.560
*
 0.274
**
 
 (0.23) (0.06) (0.29) (0.13) 
     
comcol 0.407
**
 0.126
*
 0.312 0.241
**
 
 (0.18) (0.07) (0.28) (0.10) 
     
smctry -0.060 -0.049 0.125 0.081 
 (0.26) (0.11) (0.25) (0.23) 
     
lngdp_x 0.357
***
 0.150
***
 0.517
***
 0.132
**
 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.15) (0.06) 
     
lnpop_x 1.233
**
 0.096 0.549 0.471 
 (0.53) (0.14) (0.81) (0.33) 
     
commreligion  0.000  -0.036 
  (0.03)  (0.05) 
     
_cons 7.249 -3.173 -22.843 -10.783
***
 
 (7.80) (2.40) (14.00) (3.77) 
Estimated rho 1.051
***
 0.792
***
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
Estimated lambda 1.124
***
 0.995
***
 
(0.04) (0.05) 
N 3574212  820015  
Importer FE Yes  Yes  
Exporter FE Yes  Yes  
HS4  FE Yes  Yes  
Time FE Yes  Yes  
Standard errors in parenthesis are robust, clustered by country-pair 
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Table 2 Heckman two-step estimation (2) 
 EU 15 importers Intra EU15 trade 
   (             )   (       )   (             )   (       ) 
F -0.424
***
 -0.210
***
 -0.534
***
 -0.794
***
 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.10) 
     
  (       ) -0.406
***
 -0.097
***
   
 (0.02) (0.01)   
     
rta -0.225
***
 0.033   
 (0.08) (0.02)   
     
lndist -0.393
***
 0.199
**
 -0.534
***
 0.411
***
 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.13) 
     
contig 1.472
***
 1.004
***
 1.246
***
 1.246
***
 
 (0.20) (0.14) (0.20) (0.21) 
     
comlang_off 0.297
**
 0.287
***
 0.594
**
 0.307
**
 
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.26) (0.15) 
     
colony 0.384
**
 0.255
***
 0.661 0.823
***
 
 (0.19) (0.06) (0.62) (0.32) 
     
col45 -0.027 0.148
**
   
 (0.19) (0.07)   
     
smctry 0.042 0.375 0.016 -0.333 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.30) (0.26) 
     
lngdp_x 0.149 0.146
***
 0.969
***
 0.472
***
 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.27) (0.17) 
     
lnpop_x 1.063
*
 0.143 -1.682 1.838
*
 
 (0.60) (0.17) (1.33) (1.07) 
     
commreligion  0.015  0.133 
  (0.07)  (0.09) 
     
_cons -38.397
***
 -6.988
***
 -40.909
**
 7.976 
 (7.99) (2.53) (19.95) (16.16) 
Estimated rho 0.534
***
 0.424
***
 
(0.09) (0.07) 
Estimated lambda 0.903
***
 0.762
***
 
(0.03) (0.02) 
N 1487066  154056  
Importer FE Yes  Yes  
Exporter FE Yes  Yes  
HS4  FE Yes  Yes  
Time FE Yes  Yes  
Standard errors in parenthesis are robust, clustered at country-pair level 
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Table 3 Marginal effects of MRL heterogeneity 
Marginal effects on 
selection equation 
  (       ) 
Full 
Sample 
MRL 
sample 
EU 15 
importers 
Intra EU 
15  
F -0.164
***
 -0.342
***
 -0.206
***
 -0.801
***
 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) 
Marginal effects on 
outcome equation 
  (             ) 
    
F -0.084*** -0.006*** -0.210*** -0.121** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
4.4. Tables: summary statistics  
Table 4 Summary Statistics of the full sample of countries 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
          273933 4.317 2.676 0 16.221 
      3574212 0.699 0.440 0 1 
            3574212 1.196 1.459 0 6.686 
RTA 3574212 0.188 0.391 0 1 
           3574212 8.727 0.815 2.258 9.901 
Contiguous 3574212 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Common Language 3574212 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Ever Colony 3574212 0.032 0.176 0 1 
Current Colony 3574212 0.001 0.024 0 1 
Colony in 1945 3574212 0.019 0.136 0 1 
Common colonizer 3574212 0.021 0.145 0 1 
Ever same country 3574212 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Common Religion 3574212 0.126 0.331 0 1 
                 3574212 24.384 2.463 17.053 32.823 
  (           ) 3574212 5.531 2.378 -1.568 14.377 
 
Table 5 Summary Statistics of those countries that have MRL regulations 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
          190168 4.519 2.694 0.000 16.221 
      820015 0.314 0.378 0.000 1.000 
            820015 1.265 1.450 0.000 6.686 
RTA 820015 0.405 0.491 0.000 1.000 
           820015 8.496 1.140 2.258 9.883 
Contiguous 820015 0.047 0.212 0.000 1.000 
Common Language 820015 0.108 0.311 0.000 1.000 
Ever Colony 820015 0.038 0.190 0.000 1.000 
Current Colony 820015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Colony in 1945 820015 0.009 0.094 0.000 1.000 
Common colonizer 820015 0.008 0.091 0.000 1.000 
Ever same country 820015 0.005 0.069 0.000 1.000 
Common Religion 820015 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000 
                 820015 26.996 1.654 23.178 32.823 
  (           ) 820015 6.941 2.019 2.863 14.377 
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Table 6 Summary Statistics of bilateral pairs with only EU 15 members as importers 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
          159174 4.486 2.680 0 14.315 
      1487066 0.734 0.421 0 1 
            1487066 0.598 1.124 0 5.338 
RTA 1487066 0.290 0.454 0 1 
           1487066 8.427 0.840 4.226 9.883 
Contiguous 1487066 0.019 0.138 0 1 
Common Language 1487066 0.084 0.277 0 1 
Ever Colony 1487066 0.056 0.230 0 1 
Colony in 1945 1487066 0.036 0.186 0 1 
Ever same country 1487066 0.002 0.050 0 1 
Common Religion 1487066 0.134 0.340 0 1 
                 1487066 24.097 2.411 17.466 31.265 
  (           ) 1487066 4.913 2.194 -1.558 11.597 
 
Table 7 Summary Statistics of EU15 member states 
 Observations Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
          71583 5.004 2.659 0 13.507 
      154056 0.195 0.347 0 1 
           154056 6.922 0.841 4.226 8.121 
Contiguous 154056 0.133 0.339 0 1 
Common Language 154056 0.071 0.258 0 1 
Ever Colony 154056 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Ever same country 154056 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Common Religion 154056 0.459 0.498 0 1 
                 154056 26.426 1.406 23.936 29.716 
  (           ) 154056 5.680 1.434 2.883 8.826 
 
Table 8 HS6 codes in the sample 
7 0 1 9 0 ,  7 0 2 0 0 ,  7 0 2 1 0 ,  7 0 2 3 0 ,  7 0 3 1 0 ,  7 0 3 2 0 ,  7 0 3 9 0 ,  7 0 4 1 0 ,  7 0 4 2 0 ,  
7 0 4 9 0 ,  7 0 5 1 1 ,  7 0 5 2 0 ,  7 0 5 2 1 ,  7 0 6 1 0 ,  7 0 6 9 0 ,  7 0 7 0 0 ,  7 0 8 1 0 ,  7 0 8 2 0 ,  
7 0 9 1 0 ,  7 0 9 2 0 ,  7 0 9 3 0 ,  7 0 9 4 0 ,  7 0 9 5 1 ,  7 0 9 5 2 ,  7 0 9 6 0 ,  7 0 9 7 0 ,  7 0 9 9 0 ,  
7 1 0 9 0 ,  7 1 1 3 0 ,  7 1 2 2 0 ,  7 1 3 1 0 ,  7 1 3 2 0 ,  7 1 3 3 0 ,  7 1 3 3 1 ,  7 1 3 4 0 ,  7 1 4 1 0 ,  
7 1 4 2 0 ,  8 0 1 1 0 ,  8 0 1 2 0 ,  8 0 1 3 0 ,  8 0 2 1 1 ,  8 0 2 1 2 ,  8 0 2 2 1 ,  8 0 2 2 2 ,  8 0 2 3 2 ,  
8 0 2 4 0 ,  8 0 2 5 0 ,  8 0 2 6 0 ,  8 0 2 9 0 ,  8 0 3 0 0 ,  8 0 3 3 0 ,  8 0 4 1 0 ,  8 0 4 2 0 ,  8 0 4 3 0 ,  
8 0 4 4 0 ,  8 0 4 5 0 ,  8 0 5 1 0 ,  8 0 5 1 2 ,  8 0 5 2 0 ,  8 0 5 2 2 ,  8 0 5 3 0 ,  8 0 5 4 0 ,  8 0 5 5 0 ,  
8 0 5 9 0 ,  8 0 6 1 0 ,  8 0 6 2 0 ,  8 0 7 1 0 ,  8 0 7 2 0 ,  8 0 8 1 0 ,  8 0 8 2 0 ,  8 0 9 1 0 ,  8 0 9 2 0 ,  
8 0 9 2 2 ,  8 0 9 2 4 ,  8 0 9 3 0 ,  8 0 9 4 0 ,  8 1 0 1 0 ,  8 1 0 2 0 ,  8 1 0 3 0 ,  8 1 0 4 0 ,  8 1 0 5 0 ,  
8 1 0 6 0 ,  8 1 0 9 0 ,  8 1 3 1 0 ,  8 1 3 3 0 ,  8 1 3 4 0 ,  9 0 1 1 1 ,  9 0 1 2 1 ,  9 0 2 3 0 ,  9 0 3 0 0 ,  
9 0 5 0 0 ,  9 0 6 1 0 ,  9 0 7 0 0 ,  9 0 8 1 0 ,  9 0 8 2 0 ,  9 0 8 3 0 ,  9 0 8 3 9 ,  9 0 9 1 0 ,  9 0 9 2 0 ,  
9 0 9 3 0 ,  9 0 9 4 0 ,  9 0 9 5 0 ,  9 1 0 1 0 ,  9 1 0 2 0 ,  9 1 0 3 0 ,  9 1 0 4 0 ,  9 1 0 9 1 ,  1 0 0 1 1 0 ,  
1 0 0 2 0 0 ,  1 0 0 3 0 0 ,  1 0 0 4 0 0 ,  1 0 0 5 1 0 ,  1 0 0 5 9 0 ,  1 0 0 6 1 0 ,  1 0 0 6 2 0 ,  
1 0 0 6 3 0 ,  1 0 0 6 4 0 ,  1 0 0 7 0 0 ,  1 0 0 8 1 0 ,  1 0 0 8 2 0 ,  1 0 0 8 3 0 ,  1 0 0 8 9 0 ,  
1 1 0 1 0 0 ,  1 1 0 2 1 0 ,  1 1 0 2 2 0 ,  1 1 0 2 3 0 ,  1 1 0 2 9 0 ,  1 2 0 1 0 0 ,  1 2 0 2 1 0 ,  
1 2 0 3 0 0 ,  1 2 0 3 3 0 ,  1 2 0 4 0 0 ,  1 2 0 5 0 0 ,  1 2 0 6 0 0 ,  1 2 0 7 1 0 ,  1 2 0 7 2 0 ,  
1 2 0 7 3 0 ,  1 2 0 7 4 0 ,  1 2 0 7 5 0 ,  1 2 0 7 6 0 ,  1 2 0 7 9 1 ,  1 2 0 7 9 2 ,  1 2 0 8 1 0 ,  
1 2 0 9 2 1 ,  1 2 0 9 2 6 ,  1 2 1 1 2 0 ,  1 2 1 2 9 1  
 
